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And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword before
the king. And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give
half to the one [woman], and half to the other.
-The Judgment of Solomon1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Bible depicts King Solomon resolving a dispute between
two women who claimed to be the mother of the same child. 2 In the
pursuit of justice, King Solomon threatened to do the unthinkableslice the child in two. 3 Although severing children is not a
recommended vehicle for justice, severing lawsuits is. In fact, in the
class-action context, the "issue class" established by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) 4 does just what King Solomon threatened-it

1.
1 Kings 3:24-25 (King James).
Id. at 3:16-28.
2.
Id. The child's real mother was so horrified at this prospect that she offered to allow the
3.
other woman to keep the child, while the lying woman encouraged King Solomon to split the
child in two. Knowing that the real mother would never want to harm her child, King Solomon
then gave the child to the first woman. Id.
4.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). The Rule reads that "[w]hen appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues." Id. According to
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, the paradigmatic example of the issue class was the Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp. v. Nisley antitrust case. Transcript of Session on Class Actions (Oct. 31, 1963Nov. 2, 1964), RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104-53 (Cong. Info. Serv.). That case
held that absent members of a plaintiff class could use a favorable interlocutory determination of
antitrust liability against defendants in later, individual claims for money damages. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1961) ("For one is not precluded
from claiming the benefits of a favorable judgment to which he was not a named party, simply
because he would not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment rendered against named
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severs litigation into pieces, allowing aggregate treatment of only
certain issues in a given lawsuit. 5 Residual issues are left to be
determined in plaintiff-specific, follow-on suits. 6 Although courts have
generally accepted this tool despite normative academic debate over
its utility, 7 they have not established the tool's boundaries.8 Instead,
courts haphazardly accept and reject attempts to create issue classes,
causing uncertainty about when they should be used. 9 Moving beyond
the normative discussion of issue class utility and the textual
evolution of Rule 23(c)(4), 10 this Note establishes a framework for
determining when issue classes are appropriate. Put another way, this
Note moves to the next step of King Solomon's decision: Assuming
that it is ever appropriate to split the baby, when and how should that
be done?
To frame the relevant question within the broader landscape of
class-action law and to illustrate the practical importance of issue
classes, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine a smoker you
know. Now, imagine her sucking down ten packs a day, ignorant that
cigarettes are addictive and harmful to her health. Tragically, after a
year, she develops lung cancer. Believing that the cigarette
manufacturer intentionally refrained from warning her about
nicotine's addictive properties and engineered the cigarettes' nicotine
level to sustain addiction, she hires an attorney to bring a lawsuit for
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 1' Similar smokers join her in
the lawsuit, and together they seek class certification for "all nicotinedependent persons in the United States.' 12
parties who did not adequately represent his interests.") (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
43 (1940)).
5.

See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE

LITIGATION 251 (2009).
6.
Id.
7.
See generally Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY
L.J. 709, 711 (2003); Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class
Certificationof ParticularIssues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 252 (2002).
8.
See Hannah Stott-Bumsted, Note, Severance Packages: Judicial Use of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure23(c)(4)(A), 91 GEO. L.J. 219, 221 (2002) (indicating that the actual text of Rule
23, particularly what is now FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4), has always received limited attention).
9.
Compare In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting issue class use), with Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir.
2003) (allowing issue class use).
10. For a discussion of the issue classes' textual evolution within Rule 23, focusing on the
drafters' intent to limit per se proscriptions on class certification, see Stott-Bumsted, supra note
8, at 219-25.
11. See generally Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving a
lawsuit against cigarette manufacturers).
12. Id. at 737.

1588

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1585

The court now faces several dilemmas. How can it sustain an
action for a class as a whole when individualized concerns, such as
proof of addiction, injury-in-fact, proximate cause, reliance, and
13
affirmative defenses, determine the outcome of each plaintiffs case?
May the court certify the class only as to the common, core issues of
liability, such as duty, fraud, or negligence, while requiring
individuals to litigate the remaining issues independently? 14 Even if
the court has discretion to certify some issues and not others, should
it? How should the court decide?
Given the increasing use of class actions by litigants in recent
years, 15 these questions are routine. Yet repetition has not generated
clarity. Litigants seeking class certification still muddle through a
maze of ambiguity.
Since the birth of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule
23"), which governs class actions and establishes prerequisites for
class certification, 16 federal courts have diverged on many essential
principles regarding when to certify a class. 17 These divisions may
jeopardize the efficiency of a federal judiciary already overburdened by
8
class-action litigation.'

13. See id. at 738-41.
14. Id.
15. The number of class actions filed in 2004 increased by 22% over those filed in 2003.
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Daniel Wolf, Class Certification: Trends and Developments Over the Last
Five Years (2004-2009), in THE 13TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS F-20
(A.B.A. ed., 2009). Additionally, more recent studies have shown no decrease in class actions last
year. See, e.g., FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY REPORT (2010),
available at http://www.fulbright.com/litigationtrends. As I will later mention, even after the
Supreme Court's 2011 ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the class action is still very
much alive. See infra text accompanying notes 19-24.
16. Hines, supra note 7, at 709-10.
17. For example, until recently, the Ninth Circuit diverged from all other circuits on its
view of the judicial role at the class certification stage. See Richard A. Nagareda, Common
Answers for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149, 150-51 (2010). Contrary to all
other circuits, which hold that the judiciary has an obligation to actually assess the common
qualities of the proposed class in what is almost a mini-trial, the Ninth Circuit in Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc. held that "[t]he disagreement [between the parties as to whether common
questions exist] is the common question" that gives rise to certification and that "deciding which
side has been more persuasive is an issue for the next phase of the litigation." 603 F.3d 571, 609
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). This Ninth Circuit standard made class certification particularly easy
to satisfy, but was recently overruled in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
18. In April 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee released a report addressing the
"workload crisis" in the federal courts, noting that between 1958 and 1988, the caseload of the
federal courts tripled. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 30 (5th ed. 2007). Moreover,
in December 1995 the Judicial Conference of the United States released a report suggesting that
efforts should be made to resist expanding federal jurisdiction. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 8, 21-38 (1995).
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This remains true even after the Supreme Court's 2011
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, where the Court ruled
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted broad state laws that
made class-action waivers in consumer adhesion contracts
unenforceable. 19 This holding encourages companies to include classaction waivers in predispute contracts. 20 But this is not the death of
the class action. 2 1 Even though this holding may diminish products
22
liability and employment-related class actions in the short-term, it
will not wipe them out.23 Additionally, other types of class actions that
do not involve predispute contracts, such as securities class actions,
24
will likely remain on the rise.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and the Supreme Court's
controversial decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
19. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
20. Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. & David Ross, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion-What the
Supreme Court's April 27 Ruling Means for Employers, THE WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION BLOG
(Apr.
27,
2011),
http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/class-certification/att-mobility-vconcepcion---what-the-supreme-courts-april-27-ruling-means-for-employers/.
21. Many scholars and reporters have even said that this case heralds the "end of classaction litigation." See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-action
Suits, SFGATE.COM, Nov. 7, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com2010-11-07/opinion/24818566
_1class-action-class-action-suits-federal-arbitration-act.
22. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the court was
overly concerned by the burdens of class actions and asking "[w]hat rational lawyer would have
signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a
$30.22 claim?").
23. Lower courts have determined that arbitration agreements are still subject to
unconscionability analysis. See, e.g., Kanbar v. O'Melveny & Myers, No. C-11-0892 EMC, 2011
WL 2940690, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) ("In short, arbitration agreements are still subject to
unconscionability analysis."); Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp.,
197 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1158 n.4 (Ct. App. 2011) ("General state law doctrine pertaining to
unconscionability is preserved unless it involves a defense that applies 'only to arbitration or
that derive[s] [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.' " (citing
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.)) Additionally, courts have recently held that Concepcion does not
apply to class actions brought under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004. Brown v. Ralphs
Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 500 (Ct. App. 2011) ("AT&T does not provide that a public
right, such as that created under the PAGA, can be waived if such a waiver is contrary to state
law." (citing Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). The National
Labor Relations Board has also issued complaints against companies that maintain class-action
waivers in employment contracts. Maatman & Ross, supra note 20. This action is based on the
theory that these agreements interfere with employee statutory rights to engage in concerted
activity. Id. Additionally, the EEOC might step in to promote the use of aggregate litigation
against employers who are violating federal law. Id.
24. See Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-21 to F-22 (noting that that there was a slight
increase in securities class actions and a large increase in both ERISA and labor class actions
between
2003
and
2004);
Paul
Karlsgodt,
Concepcion
Point/Counterpoint,
CLASSACTIONBLAWG.COM (May 26, 2011), http://classactionblawg.comltag/class-action-trends/.
Mr. Karlsgodt even goes one step further and suggests that, despite Concepcion, consumer class
actions might even increase. Id.
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already threaten the federal judiciary's efficiency because they
increase federal jurisdiction over class-action lawsuits. 25 More
generally, the lack of clarification in certification law also threatens
judicial efficiency for a number of reasons. First, class-action plaintiffs
fearing removal to federal court may forgo state court and choose to
litigate in federal jurisdictions with more generous approaches to
certification. 26 Additionally, defendants may remove to get out of state
courts that are friendly to certification. These "friendly" jurisdictions,
such as the Second and the Ninth Circuits, where over forty percent of
class-action lawsuits already take place, could be crushed by the high
demand for adjudication. 27 Second, this forum-choice latitude is of
great theoretical concern because it results in a practical nullification
of more exacting approaches to certification-even when those
28
approaches constitute the rule of law in a majority of jurisdictions.
Allowing these "friendly" jurisdictions, which constitute a minority, to
effectively set the law for the entire country contravenes principles of
federalism and judicial fairness. Finally, abundant divergence in legal
treatment results in abundant appeals. This slows the wheels of the
judicial process and leaves litigants without remedy for a prolonged
period of time.
But fear not: 29 although issue class certification remains
unclear, consensus is slowly emerging on many of the broader
quandaries. For instance, even prior to the Supreme Court's 2011
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,30 most courts addressed
25. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-23 to F-24. Under the Class Action Fairness Act,
litigants in a diversity-based class action are exempted from fulfilling the complete diversity
requirement so long as the aggregate amount in controversy totals to over $5 million. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(d), 1435, 1711-15 (2006). Similarly, the decision in Allapattah Servs. now makes it
necessary for only one plaintiff to meet the $75,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy to
obtain federal jurisdiction over a diversity action. See generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). At least one study shows a significant increase in removals to
federal court following the Class Action Fairness Act. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT 2 (2008), available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts

/rulesandpolicies/rules/CAFA&uscore;reportO906.pdf. Note, however, that some scholars
suggest that these class actions might be less likely to get certified due to stricter federal
standards. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1475, 1520 (suggesting that it "behooves litigants and courts to develop a more integrated
approach to the selection and adjudication of common issues of fact or law that recur in the
claims of numerous parties").
26. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-24.
27. Id. at F-20.
28. Nagareda, supra note 17, at 156.
29. See Isaiah 54:4 (King James).
30. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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31
questions pertaining to the merits when ruling on class certification.
Other questions-such as when, if ever, it is appropriate to certify
claims for monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2)-have also been
clarified by the Supreme Court. 32 In fact, recent Supreme Court
decisions, including Dukes and Smith v. Bayer,33 signify the Court's
newfound willingness to clarify the certification conundrums emerging
from the lower courts. While they are at it, the justices should take the
opportunity to clarify the proper use of issue class certification, an
34
area relatively unexplored by both courts and academics.
As mentioned above, 35 issue class certification is a litigation
tool established by Rule 23(c)(4) that allows for an action to be
"brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues." 36 The only additional requirement for certifying an issue class,
above and beyond the general requirements of Rule 23(a), which apply
to all class actions, and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), which apply
to all opt-out classes (of which an issue class is one type), is that
certification must be "appropriate. 3 7 Most courts interpret Rule
23(c)(4) to allow certification of single issues, even when they deem it
inappropriate to certify the entire constellation of issues in a given
38
litigation.
Although
many scholars
have explored how courts
39
contemplating partial certification should interpret the general Rule
23(a) certification requirements, 40 few have contemplated what

31. Nagareda, supra note 17, at 150 ("A body of doctrine has emerged from the lower federal
courts with the promise of eventually yielding a distinctive law of class certification. Rather than
look simply for 'some showing' of compliance with the requirements for class certification in Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must affirmatively determine that those
requirements are indeed satisfied.").
32. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
33. Id.; Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011) (prohibiting the issuance of an
injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act's relitigation exception and holding that a federal class
action does not bar different plaintiffs in a similar, state-wide class-action lawsuit from seeking
certification because different legal standards governed).
34. Most scholarly debate about issue classes centers around the tool's normative value. See
generally Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue ClassAction, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 60910 (2004) [hereinafter Hines, DangerousAllure]; Hines, supra note 7, 763-64; Romberg, supra
note 7, 333-34.
35. See supra p. 1586.
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
37. Id.
38. NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 251.
39. For purposes of this Note the terms partial certification and issue class certification will
be used interchangeably.
40. The prerequisite requirements under Rule 23(a) include numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). These requirements, as well as the additional
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considerations would make partial certification appropriate. 41 Because
the language of the Rule gives little guidance on the matter, 42 case law
must help determine when it is appropriate to employ Rule 23(c)(4) to
certify only some issues for class treatment, rather than all issues
implicated in a given litigation.
Drawing on recent cases and academic work, this Note
suggests a judicial standard. Part II briefly reviews the current state
of the certification inquiry and traces the emergence of the issue class,
culminating in the issue class's ultimate acceptance by the majority of
courts. Part II also outlines the common barriers that continue to
prevent issue class certification in specific contexts. Part III explores
recent judicial determinations involving issue classes, organized by
type of division, and argues that courts have already begun to create a
rubric for determining when issue classes are appropriate. The rubric
suggests that the appropriateness of issue class certification should,
and does, turn on the degree to which the issues under consideration
for class treatment are conceptually separable from the remaining
issues. Part IV argues that the draft suggestions proposed by the
American Law Institute ("ALI") in 2009 accurately track this
preexisting formula, and courts should, in large part, adopt them.
Finally, in order to make these ALI proposals more judicially
workable, this Note urges the adoption of a multifactor balancing test
for issue class appropriateness and a burden-shifting approach to
choice-of-law conflicts.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Nuts and Bolts of Class Certification
Before delving into the realm of issue classes, this Note reviews
the basic requirements that a would-be class must satisfy in order to
attain judicial permission to litigate in the aggregate. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 43 regulate "certification," which is judicial
prerequisite requirements for opt-out classes, which include a predominance of common issues
and superiority of the class-action format, are briefly described in Part II.A.
41. See Hines, supra note 7, at 711 (arguing that allowing issue classes to fulfill the
predominance requirement when the issue under consideration does not predominate among the
litigation as a whole, would be an "end-run" around Rule 23(b)(3)); Romberg, supra note 7, at
294-98 (suggesting that it is appropriate to certify issue classes even when the issue under
consideration does not "predominate" as among all issues in a given litigation).
42.

2009).
43.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §2.02 (Proposed Final Draft

Rule 23 governs class actions while Rule 23.1 governs derivative actions.
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permission for aggregate litigation. Specifically, Rules 23(a) and 23(b)
44
govern this practice.
Rule 23(a) establishes four general requirements that all class
actions must satisfy. 45 These requirements are: (1) numerosity, which
sets a standard of practicality on the minimum number of plaintiffs
required to comprise a class; 46 (2) commonality, which requires all
members in a class action to share at least a single common question
of law or fact;47 (3) typicality, which requires that "the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of claims or defenses
of the class"; 48 and (4) adequacy of representation, which ensures that

44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b).
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
46. Although commonly known as "numerosity," the specific wording of the rule requires
that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(1). Some circuits, such as the Second Circuit, have adopted a specific number, over which
identifiable, would-be classes presumptively satisfy this requirement. See Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d. Cir. 1995) (stating that classes with forty class
members or more meet this requirement). Other circuits, however, such as the Tenth Circuit,
have declined to adopt a strict numerical test. See Trevizo v. Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th
Cir. 2006) ("[T]here is no set formula to determine if the class is so numerous that it should be
certified." (citing Rex v. Owens ex rel. State of Okla. 585 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1978))). Where
there is no presumption that the requirement has been satisfied, many jurisdictions utilize a
balancing test that considers several factors. See Ansari v. N. Y. Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering the following factors: "(1) the judicial economy that will arise from
avoiding multiple actions; (2) the geographic dispersion of members of the proposed class; (3) the
financial resources of those members; (4) the ability of the members to file individual suits; and
(5) requests for prospective relief that may have an effect on future class members"); see also
Jones v. Roy, 202 F.R.D. 658, 665 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (finding that a twenty-one member class did
not meet the numerosity requirement because of factors such as geographic diversity, judicial
economy, and the ease of identifying class members). Moreover, other factors, such as vagueness
of the pleading of failure to specify how class members will be identified may also result in a
failure to satisfy numerosity. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-26.
47. The Rule specifically requires that "there are questions of law or fact common to the
class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (2006). This is generally considered to be a fairly easy standard to
satisfy. See Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-26. However, as with the numerosity
requirements, jurisdictions diverge in how they apply the standard. Compare Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) ("All questions of fact and law need not be common to
satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is
sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the
class."), and Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 599 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ('rhe
commonality test is qualitative rather than quantitative-one significant issue common to the
class may be sufficient to warrant certification."), with In re Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. Indus. Life
Ins. Litig., No. 3:01-5000-CMC (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2007) (finding that commonality was not present
where the litigation involved several "plan codes" over numerous years and involving numerous
states).
48. FED. R. C1V. P. 23(a)(3). As with the commonality requirement, historically, this
standard has not been demanding. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-35. However, there is
reason to believe that the more recent tendency is to define typicality in a more rigid manner. Id.
at F-36. Additionally, in practice, the typicality requirement tends to overlap with the
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the class representative in a given action will appropriately and
"fairly" represent and "protect" the interests of the entire class. 49
In addition to fulfilling Rule 23(a)'s general prerequisites,
would-be classes must also fit within one of the three defined
categories that Rule 23(b) establishes. 50 Fitting within one of these
51
class types often requires fulfilling additional requirements.
The major distinction between the three class types is based on
whether class membership is mandatory or whether would-be
members have the opportunity to opt out. 52 Subsections 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(2) both authorize mandatory class actions, whereas subsection
53
23(b)(3) authorizes opt-out class actions.
Subsection 23(b)(2) applies where plaintiffs predominantly seek
injunctive relief. Subsection 23(b)(1) allows for certification of a
mandatory class where the prosecution of "separate actions by or
against individual class members would create a risk of
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class." 54 Although the two subsections are
distinct under the Rules, in reality, they have largely merged with
each other. 55 While some circuits still occasionally struggle with minor
questions about whether plaintiffs satisfied the requirements to
establish these types of mandatory classes, 56 more difficulty emerges
from the opt-out classes under Rule 23(b)(3).
commonality requirement. Id. One common reason leading would-be classes to fail the typicality
requirement exists where injuries are highly individualized. Id. at F-41.
49. The adequacy of representation requirement generally encompasses two separate
inquiries. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-43. The first requires an absence of substantial

conflicts of interest between the representatives and the class. Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513
F.3d 1314, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008). The second requires a determination by the court that the
representative will adequately prosecute the class action. Id.
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
51. See id.
52. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-62. Note that the ability to opt out of class
membership is based on constitutional due process rights. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
54. NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 193-94 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)).
55. Id. at 195.
56. One such question that is treated differently among circuits stems from the advisory
committee notes to subsection 23(b)(3), which infers that mandatory classes under this
subsection might also encompass some monetary damage claims so long as those claims are
nonpredominate. Id. at 194. For example, the Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits
generally disallow Rule 23(b)(2) classes from seeking monetary damages. Coffee & Wolf, supra
note 15, at F-67. However, in Dukes v.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held, over a
vehement dissent by Judge Kleinfeld, that a Rule 23(b)(2) class could remain certified even
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Today, most class actions-usually those involving a high
proportion of monetary damages-attempt to qualify for class
treatment under Rule 23(b)(3), particularly if they fail certification
under 23(b)(2). 57 However, establishing this type of class action
requires the would-be class to demonstrate the following, in addition
to Rule 23(a)'s general requirements: that common issues of law and
fact "predominate" over individual issues5 8 and that the would-be class
"is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." 59 Additionally, the court must also
consider "the likely difficulties in managing the class action." 60 These
requirements are known as the "predominance," "superiority," and
"manageability" requirements, respectively. 61 Though different federal
circuits continue to approach these inquiries differently, Rule 23(b)(3)
opt-out classes are most often denied certification on predominance
grounds. 62 Variations in state law, as well as the individual nature of
both damages and specific claim elements-such as proximate cause
63
in mass tort cases-often thwart a finding of predominance.
Together, the requirements for class certification play an
essential role in determining when issue classes are appropriate. As
this Note will next demonstrate, modern use of the issue class tool
evolved from changes in the federal judiciary's approach to the general
certification inquiry. Exploring that history and placing the issue class
within its appropriate context facilitates understanding of the
instrument's utility and its drawbacks.
B. The Emergence and Development of the Issue Class
1. The Eisen Evolution: The New Rigor of Class Certification
Until the late 1980s, courts largely ignored Rule 23(c)(4),
choosing instead to make class certification decisions based on the
litigation as a whole. 6 4 In fact, the only courts that employed Rule
23(c)(4) used it as a bifurcation mechanism in order to separate the
though the monetary damages sought by the plaintiffs could amount to billions of dollars. 603
F.3d 571, 616-19 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
57. See, e.g., Dukes, 603 F.3d at 615.
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
59. Id.
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
61. See generally NAGAREDA, supranote 5, at ch. 2(C).
62. See Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-76.
63. Id.
64. Hines, supra note 7, at 727-29.
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liability and damages portions of cases involving claims for economic
relief.65 Today, courts consider bifurcation, which is governed by Rule
42(a), 66 as distinct from issue class certification. It differs from issue
class certification in three primary ways: bifurcation results in only
one judgment, it can be used in non-class-action lawsuits, and it may
utilize a single jury.67 In civil trials, bifurcation generally only
issue
separates the liability and damages determinations, 68 whereas
69
ways.
of
multitude
a
in
lawsuits
divide
can
class certification
Emergence of issue class certification in its modern formwhere certification pertains to only particular issues, requiring
litigants to resolve remaining issues in independent trials-derives
from a broader doctrinal shift in certification analysis. 70 This shift
reflects a departure from early interpretations of a passage from Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, which stated that Rule 23 does not authorize
a court to "conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
71
order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."
Early courts interpreted this statement as a prohibition on
judicial consideration of the merits of a case at the class-certification
stage. 72 Instead, to achieve certification, the courts required only some
minimal showing of the elements of Rule 23 prior to certifying a
class. 73 But such a rigid prohibition of merit consideration began to
lose favor as early as 1982, when the Supreme Court announced its
decision in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon.7 4 There, the Court
decertified a plaintiff class in a Title VII action comprising of MexicanAmerican employees who were either passed up for promotion by the
defendant or altogether refused employment.7 5 The Court feared that
allowing class certification based on the specific discriminatory
treatment of one representative plaintiff could lead to "companywide
class action[s]" in every Title VII case. 76 Without any reference to
Eisen, the Court stated:
65. Id. at 728.
66. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCus,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2388 (3d ed. 2011).

67. Compare id. § 1790 (3d ed. 2011), with id. §§ 2388, 2390.
68. Id. § 2390.
69. See id. § 1790.
70. See Nagareda, supranote 17, at 149-50.
71. 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
72. Hines, supranote 7, at 725-26.
73. Id. at 725-28.
74. See NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 274-75.
75. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
76. Id. at 159.
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We do not, of course, judge the propriety of a class certification by hindsight. The
District Court's error in this case, and the error inherent in the across-the-board rule, is
the failure to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiffs plea that he is a
proper class representative under Rule 23(a). As we [previously] noted in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, ... "the class determination generally involves
considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the
plaintiff's cause of action.'" Sometimes the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to
determine whether the interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the
court to probe behind
named plaintiffs claim, and sometimes it may be necessary for the
77
the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.

Because "probing behind the pleadings" requires courts to delve
into the merits of the case during the certification hearing, the Court's
ruling was inconsistent with rigid interpretations of Eisen. More
recent cases, beginning with the Second Circuit's decision in In re IPO
Securities Litigation (Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.), have
reinterpreted the Eisen rule in light of Falcon saying, "[a] district
court still must give full and independent weight to each Rule 23
requirement, regardless of whether that requirement overlaps with
the merits."78 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(c) seems to
support this new interpretation:
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly part of the
certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes
information required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented
at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the "merits,"
limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed
79
basis.

Today, most circuits agree that courts must conduct a more
rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements than the Eisen approach
prior to certifying a class.8 0 To assist in this inquiry, the Second and
Third Circuits demand that plaintiffs prove each certification
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence.8 1 Such a shift has led
one commentator to remark that "[g]one... are approaches whereby
77. Id. at 160 (internal citations omitted).
78. 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit also employed the same language in
OscarPrivateEquity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 277 (5th Cir. 2007).
79. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c), advisory committee's note.
80. See, e.g., Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009); In re New Motor
Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2008); Oscar Private Equity, 487
F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004). The
Second and Third Circuits have also adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard for
plaintiffs hoping to certify a class. Coffee & Wolf, supranote 15, at F-55.
81. See Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Factual
determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.");
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.
2008) ("[The preponderance of the evidence standard applies to evidence proffered to establish
Rule 23's requirements.").
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the court, in ruling on class certification, must avoid any question that
overlaps with the parties' dispute on the merits. 8' 2 Though these
"enhanced"
certification
proceedings
arguably
strengthen
8
certification's ability to generate settlements, 3 they also make it more
difficult to achieve class certification.
2. The Normative Issue Class Debate
Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions also pose a particular
problem for plaintiffs seeking certification. With the recent shift to a
more exacting certification inquiry, courts began more rigorously
enforcing the certification requirement that common issues of law and
fact "predominate" over individual issues.8 4 Enforcement of this
provision thwarted class certification where common issues in a given
litigation could not overcome the individual issues.8 5 Decisions finding
an absence of predominance were commonly based on factors such as
variations in state law, the difficulty in measuring damages, and the
8 6
individual nature of various claim elements.
To solve this problem, plaintiffs eager to achieve class
certification turned to issue classes as a means of preserving
aggregate litigation. They argued that Rule 23(c)(4), which allows
specific issues to be certified for adjudication while leaving more
individualized issues to be decided in separate trials, narrowed the
court's focus only to whether certain issues met the Rule 23(b)(3)
requirements.8 7 By arguing that plaintiffs needed to satisfy the
certification requirements only with respect to a particular issue and
not with respect to the entire litigation, class counsel effectively
sought to use this provision to carve out the individual issues
inappropriate for class treatment. Essentially, these class counselors
82. See Nagareda, supra note 17, at 149.
83. See id. at 152.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
85. Despite this being the more common approach to the predominance analysis, some
courts-including the Sixth Circuit-still hold that predominance is satisfied if the common
question in the lawsuit "is at the heart of the litigation." Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub.
Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007). Under this analysis, "[t]he mere fact that
questions peculiar to each individual member of the class action remain after the common
questions of the defendant's liability have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion that a
class action is impermissible." Id. at 619 (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188,
1197 (6th Cir. 1988)). However, cases involving a single claim or theory of wrongdoing are more
likely to satisfy predominance in these jurisdictions. See id.
86. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-76.
87. These prerequisites include the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
requirements.
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hoped that by "splitting the baby" into certifiable and noncertifiable
issues, the former might survive. Despite other weaknesses, class
counsel viewed partial certification of amenable issues as highly
desirable because it allowed them to more efficiently prove liability on
certified issues. Additionally, at the very least, it also offered class
counsel settlement leverage-leverage some commentators think is
88
undeserved.
Reframing the issue class stirred the proverbial pot, launching
academic debate on the tool's proper use.8 9 Opponents of this emergent
use have argued that it unfairly favors plaintiffs and thwarts the
purpose of Rule 23.90 These academics feel strongly that courts should
only certify classes meeting the certification requirements for the
litigation as a whole. Professor Laura Hines has stated that the
framers of Rule 23 "never intended . . .to authorize expansive issue
class actions" in this manner.9 1 She finds support for this position by
analogy to the Supreme Court's rejection of a settlement-only class 92
in Amchem Products v. Windsor based on the fact that the class did
93
not meet the adequacy and predominance requirements of Rule 23.
In that case, Justice Ginsburg noted that a settlement-only class
"rests on a conception of Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement
irreconcilable with the Rule's design" because allowing it would strip
the "vital prescription [of predominance] ...of any meaning. '94 Hines
believes that this statement goes beyond settlement-only classes,

88. NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 193. It also allowed class plaintiffs to more efficiently prove
liability on certified issues.
89. Hines, supranote 7, at 717; Romberg, supra note 7, at 255.
90. See Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-55; Hines, supra note 7, at 709; David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 955 (1998) (arguing
that Rule 23(b)(3) overrides issue class certification unless those issue "predominate" over the
individual issues in the case).
91. Hines, supra note 7, at 748; see generally Hines, DangerousAllure, supra note 34, at
609-10 (noting that the issue class "presents a tempting solution to the seemingly intractable
shortcomings of mass tort class actions" due to the tool's simplicity and ability to allow
certification even when class claims fail the predominance or superiority requirements of Rule
23(b)(3)).
92. A settlement-only class is the certification of a class that is only intended to facilitate
settlement and does not have judicial approval to proceed to trial as a class action. Hines, supra
note 7, at 749.
93. Id.; see Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-25 (1997).
94. Hines, supra note 7, at 749-51 (arguing that issue class certifications are akin to the
settlement-only classes rejected in Amchem because both should be construed as additional
allowances of Rule 23 instead of as a separate means to certification that allows for a bypass of
certification requirements) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-25 (1997)).
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interpreting it to mean that certification of singular issues cheats the
95
system and creates an inappropriate class.
On the other hand, proponents of issue class certification argue
that the tool yields great benefits for judicial efficiency, while reducing
expenses, by trying complex issues only once. 96 These issue class fans
97
think issue classes should receive the same treatment as subclasses.
Subclasses are the sister provision of the issue class, governed by Rule
23(c)(5), that allow "a class [to] be divided into subclasses that are
each treated as a class."9 8 Unlike with issue classes, where singular
issues are certified as to all plaintiffs, under the subclass rule, the
subunits considered for certification are generally groups of plaintiffs
that share a common attribute. 99 Different representatives are
generally appointed for each subclass. 10 0 Scott Dodson believes that
subclasses should be viewed by courts under a "replacement
theory,"'' which allows subclasses to evade the "certification ringer"
and achieve certification even where a court cannot certify a global
class.10 2 This means that courts view the subclass by "the unit that
has actually been certified for collective resolution," not by the
litigation as a whole.' 03 Issue class proponents have argued that issue

95. Id. at 749-52.
96. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-107; Romberg, supra note 7, at 299 (describing issue
certification as "a happy medium between individual cases and a global class action" because of
its efficiency and fairness); see Cabraser, supra note 25, at 1520 (suggesting that the use of issue
class actions is part of a class action counterreformation that "is a creature of necessity").
97. Romberg, supra note 7, at 297. Subclasses are considered the "sister provision" to issue
classes. See Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2351, 2353-54 (2006) (starting the
discussion on the utility of subclasses).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). Formerly, the issue class certification rule was in FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(4)(A) and the subclass rule was in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
99. See, e.g., In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 543 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (articulating the
difference between issue classes and subclasses). Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(5), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
100. JUDGE WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, JUDGE A. WALLACE TASHIMA & JAMES W. WAGSTAFFE,
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, 9TH CIRCUIT EDITION § 10:309 (2011).
101. "Replacement theory" is the concept that subclasses can be certified without regard to
the certifiability of the class action as a whole. Dodson, supra note 97, at 2362. This is often
juxtaposed to a competing theory called the "contingency theory," which says that a subclass
cannot exist if the entire class cannot be certified as a whole. Id.
102. Id. at 2354 (arguing that the text of Rule 23(c)(5) supports the "replacement theory").
Dodson also believes that in Amchem, the court alluded to the fact that subclasses may have
helped the class overcome the denial of certification. Id. at 2387.
103. Romberg, supranote 7, at 297.
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classes deserve consistent treatment, 10 4 a view that has prevailed in
10 5
several courts.
3. Acceptance of the Issue Class and Barriers to Partial Certification
Contrary to the wishes of commentators who fully oppose issue
class actions, most circuits-namely the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, and Ninth-issued decisions supporting the more liberal
approach to issue class certifications. 10 6 These circuits generally
believe that courts may employ Rule 23(c)(4) "regardless of whether
the claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement."1 0 7 Despite this trend, one circuit remains staunchly
particularly
requirements,
certification
view
to
unwilling
predominance, through an issue-specific aperture. The Fifth Circuit
stated that "[t]he proper interpretation of the interaction between
subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) [of Rule 23] is that a cause of action, as a
whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and that
(c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common
1 08
issues for a class trial."
Although the majority of courts disagree with the Fifth
Circuit's approach, scholars John C. Coffee, Jr. and Daniel Wolf
suggest that recent case law shows that issue class certifications are
falling out of favor with courts.1 0 9 However, recent appellate decisions
against issue class certification reflect case-specific concerns rather
than opposition to the availability of issue class certification.
In modern jurisprudence, the class action is somewhat
distinguishable from the baby before King Solomon. In the Solomon
story, the baby survived because it was not split. But, in class actions,
the lawsuit is doomed to fail if it remains whole. The issue class tool
splits the baby, reviving a class action from otherwise-certain death by
curing a fatal flaw in the certification inquiry. But, as courts are now

104. See id.
105. See, e.g., In re Paxil Litigation effectively adopts the replacement theory. 212 F.R.D. at
543; Dodson, supra note 97, at 2354 (stating that the interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)'s text
supports the replacement theory of the issue class).
106. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-108 n.32.
107. In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
108. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
109. Coffee & Wolf, supra note 15, at F-108 to F-109 (suggesting that the Second Circuit's
decision in McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008), was a significant
retreat, and perhaps reversal, from its prior support of issue class certification); Romberg, supra
note 7, at 279 ("In the mid-1990s, the judicial receptivity to issue classes came to an abrupt
halt.").
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realizing, the cure is not without risks; in some contexts, the act of
splitting the lawsuit to save the class may actually kill the class. For
example, using the issue class to split a lawsuit so that only some
issues receive class treatment may produce constitutional problems
stemming from the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause. 110
The Reexamination Clause may impede issue class certification in
cases where the issues under class consideration overlap conceptually
with issues to be tried in later proceedings. The fear is that the facts
"resolved" in the primary class proceeding would have to be reexplored by different juries, perhaps even in different jurisdictions,
during individual proceedings. This would violate the Reexamination
Clause's guarantee. Such constitutional problems do not emerge in the
bifurcation of individual cases because, in those cases, the same jury
serves as the fact finder for each phase of the litigation."' These
problems are also less likely to emerge in the subclass context, where
each subclass receives a single jury for the litigation of all subclass
claims. Issue class certification is therefore uniquely plagued by
Reexamination Clause concerns.
In other cases, the issue class may not introduce new problems,
such as Reexamination Clause issues, but it may instead fail to cure
old problems, often based on the predominance or superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). This situation is akin to applying a
Band-Aid to a wound that requires stitches. It just isn't enough. This
defect occurs most often in diversity actions involving class
representatives from multiple states. Here, choice-of-law concerns
may impede certification of either the class as a whole or the
2
individual issues, on either commonality or predominance grounds."
110. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[The judge
must not divide issues between separate trials in such a way that the same issue is reexamined
The right to a jury trial in federal civil cases, conferred by the Seventh
by different juries ....
Amendment, is a right to have juriable issues determined by the first jury impaneled to hear
them ....
and not reexamined by another finder of fact."). The Reexamination Clause provides
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Although this provision
only applies to matters where a jury trial is required by the Seventh Amendment, this category
includes all "actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and slander, for recovery of
land, and for conversion of personal property." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970). It also
includes "actions enforcing statutory rights ... if the statute creates legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 194 (1974). Therefore, the category of cases to which the Reexamination Clause applies
encompasses most class actions, including all mass tort cases.
111. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303.
112. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (determining that
choice-of-law concerns defeated the plaintiffs ability to show predominance and ultimately
decertifying a consumer class of penile implant users); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
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Why is choice of law an impediment here? The Supreme
Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins requires federal
courts sitting in diversity to apply the substantive law of the state in
which the case would normally be tried, rather than federal common
law. 113 This approach often results in situations where multiple state
laws would apply to a single class. While no problems emerge where
the various state laws are uniform, there are typically some
discrepancies between state laws.1 1 4 Courts reason that where several
differing state laws are involved in a single class litigation, judges
trying the case "would face the impossible task of instructing a jury on
the relevant law," making certification inappropriate.1 1 5 State
subclasses used in conjunction with the issue class might solve this
problem and salvage certification for certain parts of litigation, but
subclassing alone will not always be enough, as plaintiffs may have
factual differences that additionally require subclass lines to be
drawn.
Although issue class opponents suggest that certification is
never appropriate where choice-of-law problems are present, this
outcome may not always yield the most rational results in terms of
judicial efficiency. This problem is pronounced where minor nuances
116
in state law are unlikely to have any bearing on the case's outcome.
Given these barriers, the story of the issue class is not unlike the story
of King Solomon. In fact, just as the child's true mother in that
parable feared,11 7 in some cases splitting the baby wouldn't solve the
problem even in theory. To help make the decision of when to slice
versus when to sheathe, this Note turns to established law.

at 1300. These same choice-of-law concerns contributed to the denial of class certification of
litigation as a whole in In re Dalkon Shield IUD ProductsLiability Litigation.693 F.2d 847, 850,
854 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement was not satisfied in
part because the fifty jurisdictions in which cases arose did not apply the same punitive damages
standards).
113. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
114. In re Dalkon Shield Litig., 693 F.2d at 847 (holding that the commonality requirement
was not met where fifty jurisdictions in which cases arose did not apply the same punitive
damage standards).
115. In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1085. Subclasses are an alternative way to cure
some of these problems without necessarily running into severe Reexamination Clause problems.
However, they are beyond the scope of this Note.
116. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1300 (recognizing that "some level of
generality [exists in] the law of negligence ...not only nationwide but worldwide"). This perhaps
demonstrates that nuances in state negligence law may or may not have had much of an actual
impact on this case.
117. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
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III. ANALYSIS OF ISSUE CLASS APPROPRIATENESS: RECENT TRENDS IN
CASE LAW

A. To Split or Not to Split: How Issue Class Use Turns on the Issue
Being Excised
Recent case law illustrates the good news and the bad news
behind issue class certification. The bad news is that many of the
same jurisdictions, the same courts, and even the same judges appear
inconsistent in their approaches to partial certification. This leaves
attorneys unsure of the state of the law and leads to often unjust,
inconsistent, and inefficient results. But there is a silver lining:
although their insights are buried within the jurisprudence, some
courts consider the appropriateness of the issue class during their
general certification inquiry, and, from their decisions, this Note
pieces together a rubric for determining issue class appropriateness.
From these decisions, it is clear that not all issue classes are alike. 118
In fact, as this Note will show, two considerations seem to materially
affect issue class appropriateness: (A) what issues are being excised
for class treatment and (B) what type of substantive law is involved.
There are many ways to separate the issues arguably suited for
class treatment from the remaining issues left for individualized
determination.1 9 By viewing recent court decisions based on the type
of division proposed, this Note identifies the factors affecting the grant
or denial of partial certification. 120 The following divisions track those
most frequently considered in issue class certification and guide this
Note's examination of the case law: (1) elements of liability versus
other elements of liability; (2) elements of liability versus affirmative
defenses; (3) liability versus remedy; and (4) claims for divisible relief
versus claims for indivisible relief.1 21

118. NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 251-52 (identifying that there are many different ways in
which a lawsuit can be divided and noting the four primary "types" of divisions discussed in this
Note). This Note, however, goes one step further and organizes case law into these various
categories in order to identify why issue-only certification was either granted or denied. See infra
Part III.A.1-4.
119. NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 251-52.
120. See id.
121. Id.
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122
1. Elements of Liability vs. Other Elements of Liability

A resolution of liability generally requires plaintiffs to prove
multiple elements in a cause of action. For example, in cases involving
simple negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty of care, the
plaintiff suffered an injury, and the defendant's breach was the actual
and proximate cause of that injury. 12 3 Although the elements of a
claim differ depending on the cause of action alleged, some aspects of
liability are more individualized to particular plaintiffs, whereas
others focus exclusively upon the defendant's conduct.1 24 Elements
specific to a defendant's conduct are most likely to attain class
certification because all plaintiffs in a class share them. Despite the
commonalities, courts often reject issue class certification in these
cases, 125 due to many of the reasons previously discussed. 126 The
likelihood of achieving issue class certification on one or several
elements in a cause of action may depend on the underlying
substantive law claim because some substantive law claims have more
easily divisible elements than other substantive law claims. 127 The
following sections explore cases involving products liability and
general tort claims, consumer fraud claims, environmental tort claims,
and constitutional tort claims.
a. Products Liability Cases and General Torts
Products liability and negligence plaintiffs, who often suffer
distinct, individualized injuries from use of a common, allegedly
defective product or service, usually seek to invoke partial certification
on the following elements: duty, breach, negligence, injury, product
defect, and causation-in-fact. This is particularly common in drug or
122. Throughout this Section, I will use "elements of liability" and "elements of a cause of
action" interchangeably.
123. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 2 (2011).
124. NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 251 (identifying that some elements of a cause of action
may "focus exclusively upon the defendant's conduct and others of which entail examination of
particular plaintiffs' conduct").
125. See e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying issue
class certification); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc. 97 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1996)
(vacating issue class certification and remanding case back to district court); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1308 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying issue class certification).
126. See discussion supraParts II.B.1-2.
127. Compare In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding
issue class certification on broad liability issues), with In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
at 1308 (denying issue class certification on elements of a claim).
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medical products liability cases. However, despite repeated
opportunities, courts have largely declined to permit issue class
128
certification in this context.
For example, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, reversed on a writ of
mandamus the district court's decision to certify a nationwide class
with respect to "whether the defendants [were] negligent under either
of [the two] theories [advanced by plaintiffs]."129 The plaintiffs, a group
of HIV-positive hemophiliacs who used the defendants' blood solid
products, first alleged that the defendants failed to exercise due care
130
with respect to preventing consumers from contracting Hepatitis B.
They argued that, had the defendants fulfilled this duty, the plaintiffs
would have been "serendipitously" protected against HIV. 13' Second,
the plaintiffs argued that the defendants negligently failed to screen
donors and prevent contamination of their product upon learning
132
about HIV in the early 1980s.
The Seventh Circuit based its decision to decertify on the
cumulative impact of three primary factors. 133 First, the court
considered the risk that the plaintiffs might prevail on their class
claim due solely to the human appeal of their case-potentially forcing
134
the defendants into settlements despite a lack of legal liability.
Instead of staking everything on a single, negligence-determinative
issue class proceeding, the court suggested that the question of the
defendants' negligence should instead "emerge from a decentralized
process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different
135
standards of liability, in different jurisdictions."'

128. See e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 751-52 (denying issue class certification); Valentino v.
Carter-Wallace,97 F.3d at 1234; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1308 (denying issue
class certification).
129. 51 F.3d at 1297.
130. Id. at 1296.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1299-1302.
134. Id. at 1299 ("The first is a concern with forcing these defendants to stake their
companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to
settle even if they have no legal liability, when it is entirely feasible to allow a final,

authoritative determination of their liability for the colossal misfortune that has befallen the
hemophiliac population to emerge from a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving
different juries, and different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions; and when, in
addition, the preliminary indications are that the defendants are not liable for the grievous harm
that has befallen the member of the class.").
135. Id.
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Second, the court considered the choice-of-law problem and
expressed its discomfort with the fact that the district judge would
have to "determine the negligence of the defendants under a legal
standard that does not actually exist anywhere in the world." 136 While
recognizing that the law of negligence has some level of nationwide
uniformity, the court also noted that small nuances in the law are
important, particularly where pattern jury instructions on negligence
and judicial formulations of "the meaning of negligence and the
137
subordinate concepts" differ and may affect the outcome.
With respect to the plaintiffs' first theory of liability, the court
specifically recognized that, in jurisdictions that apply Judge
Cardozo's famous Palsgrafopinion, the HIV-positive plaintiffs could be
barred from recovery because they might be outside of the zone of
foreseeable victims. 138 The Palsgraf opinion, which involved a man
who dropped a package of fireworks on a railroad track, basically held
that no liability attached for injuries that fell beyond the realm of
possibility139-in this case, the lethal spread of HIV, which was at the
time relatively unknown. The court, however, noted that jurisdictions
that do not use this foreseeability test would not consider this
limitation. 140 The court also noted that differing state views on the
role of industry practice might materially affect a determination of
negligence.' 4 ' Most notably, the standard of care for medical providers
differs by state, as some states apply a professional standard while
142
others apply an ordinary-care standard.
Third, the court was concerned that issue class certification of
negligence issues would ultimately offend the Seventh Amendment's
Reexamination Clause. The court feared that juries in the follow-on,
individual cases would have to reexamine the negligence issue-the
issue formally resolved by the first jury-in deciding proximate
cause. 143 In his opinion, Judge Posner emphasized that a "district
judge must carve at the joint... [and] must not divide issues between

136. Id. at 1300.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally PaIsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928) ("[T]here
was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in
newspaper would spread wreckage through the station.").
140. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1297.
141. Id. at 1301.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1302-03.
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separate trials in such a way that the same issue is reexamined by
'
different juries. "144
Judge Posner's constitutional concern seems to stem from the
fact that negligence and proximate cause are so conceptually
intertwined that one cannot be determined independently of the
other. 145 Effectively, both negligence and proximate cause require fact
finders to consider both the same facts and general causation. In
support of this point, he states:
[The] issue[ overlap[s] [with] the issue of the defendants' negligence... . Proximate
causation is found by determining whether the harm to the plaintiff followed in some
sense naturally, uninterruptedly, and with reasonable probability from the negligent act
of the defendant. It overlaps the issue of the defendant's negligence even when the state
law does not (as many states do) make the foreseeability of the risk to which the
defendant subjected the plaintiff an explicit ingredient of negligence. 146

Similarly, in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., the Fifth
Circuit denied issue class certification on "core liability issues" to a
nationwide class of nicotine-dependent smokers. 147 In Castano, both
Reexamination Clause and choice-of-law concerns defeated issue class
certification. First, the court said that the Reexamination Clause
allows issues to be bifurcated only when they "are so separable that
the second jury will not be called upon to reconsider findings of fact by
the first."148 The court's concern was that if the class was certified as
to liability, the second jury responsible for considering comparative
negligence and apportioning damages would be tempted to "reevaluate
the defendant's fault ... [thereby] reconsidering the findings of a first
jury."'149 Second, even though the case required application of the Fifth
Circuit's now-aberrational requirement that the litigation as a whole
must satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement prior to
issue class certification, choice-of-law concerns independently
destroyed predominance and therefore warranted decertification. 150
The court rejected class counsel's arguments that no material
differences existed among state warranty laws and suggested that the
burden was on class proponents to demonstrate the absence of conflict
or the manageability of small legal nuances. 151 Dicta within the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id.
84 F.3d 734, 737, 739-40 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 740-41.
Id. at 742-44.
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opinion also revealed a more generalized concern regarding the lack of
superiority of class actions over individualized litigation in this type of
action, where individual litigation may be financially worthwhile for
each plaintiff.152 The court suggested that issue class treatment would
result in judicial waste instead of judicial economy, because issues
"resolved" through the class proceeding would have to be revisited in
the follow-on trials.153
Although the court based its decision on predominance
grounds, the same superiority concern emerged in the Second Circuit's
decision in McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., which similarly
reversed class certification in another tobacco lawsuit. 15 4 There,
although the court recognized that an issue class might be appropriate
on the element that defendants had a scheme to defraud, the court
reasoned that "larger issues such as reliance, injury and damages"
would remain for each individual plaintiff and that certification would
1 55
therefore not "materially advance the litigation."
Despite these decisions, in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit went out of its way to clarify that prior precedent
did not create an absolute bar to certification for products liability
cases, a rule that might prevent even the application of issue class use
in this context. 156 Yet, despite this statement and great efforts to
distinguish the case from In re Northern District Of California,Dalkon
Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation-which had suggested that
products liability cases suffer inherent certification problems-the
court still found deficiencies and denied certification for a class of
plaintiffs who had taken an allegedly defective epilepsy drug. 15 7 Class
counsel failed to establish Rule 23(a)'s typicality and adequacy
requirements, was deemed unable to provide adequate notice to
potential plaintiffs given the high likelihood that many potential class
members had not yet developed injuries, and had not made an
adequate showing of either predominance or how a class trial could be
conducted.158

152. Id. at 748.
153. Id. at 749.
154. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (commenting on
how class action in this case would not promote judicial economy, but basing the holding on
predominance grounds).
155. Id. at 234.
156. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1996).
157. Id. at 1228-32.
158. Id. at 1234-35.

1610

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1585

Given these outcomes, the appellate courts suggest that
products liability cases resist issue class certification of specific
elements of liability, regardless of what those elements might be. The
district courts therefore reasonably hesitate to grant issue class
certification in products liability cases on any element of liability.159
However, despite the ubiquity of issue class denials in products
liability actions, this Note cannot conclude that all claim-element
issue classes are inappropriate for certification. Future papers should
examine whether specific elements within product- or service-related
tort law are more or less amenable to issue class certification.
b. Consumer Fraud
Another area of substantive law, consumer fraud litigation, is
conceptually linked to products liability and negligence-based torts. As
a result, consumer fraud laws often support alternative causes of
action where negligence or defect is alleged. 160 However, claims based
on consumer fraud appear more amenable to element-specific class
61
treatment than products liability claims.
In the per curiam opinion in Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, also
before Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
certification order of an issue class to determine liability on six specific
elements related to the plaintiffs' consumer fraud claim surrounding a
design defect. 62 The court found that the case, which involved

159. For example, in both Kemp v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. and in Neely v. Ethicon, Inc., district
courts rejected issue class certification requests in products liability cases dealing with a weight
management drug and inadequately sterilized sutures, respectively. Kemp v. Metabolife Int'l,
Inc., No. 00-3513, 2004 WL 2095618, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2004); Neely v. Ethicon Inc., No.
1:00-CV-00569, 1:01-CV-37, 1:01-CV-38, 2001 WL 1090204, at *14-15 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2001).
160. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (alleging fraud and deceit in
addition to negligence and other causes of action).
161. See Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393-96 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district
court's certification of an issue class on liability but not for issues related to causation, damages,
and the statute of limitations).
162. Id. The elements certified consisted of the following: (1) "that all ProLine windows have
a defect which results in premature rotting and this defect requires disclosure"; (2) "that Pella
modified its warranty without notice by creating the enhancement program"; (3) "that Pella must
notify owners of the defect"; (4) "that the ten-year limitation in the original warranty is
removed"; (5) "that Pella will reassess all prior warranty claims related to wood rot"; (6) and
"that Pella, upon a class member's request, will pay the cost of inspection to determine whether
the wood rot is manifest, with any coverage of disputes adjudicated by a Special Master." Id. at
392. Although not relevant to our certification discussion here, the court in fact affirmed the
certification of several classes including one nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2) consisting of all
class members who own structures containing Pella aluminum-clad casement windows and
whose windows have some wood rot but have not yet been replaced. The other classes, certified
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allegations that a manufacturer of defective windows violated state
consumer fraud laws by failing to disclose the known defect, 163 was
relatively simple in nature and as a result, posed no "risk of error in
having complex issues that have enormous consequences decided by
one trier of fact rather than letting a consensus emerge from multiple
trials."164 Moreover, because the district court created several welldefined, state-specific classes, there were no concerns about choice of
law or that class definitions were overbroad and included too many
noninjured plaintiffs. 165 Without the state-specific classes, choice-oflaw issues may have been a concern because differences in state law
were expected to affect plaintiffs' success on obtaining favorable
verdicts on the certified elements. 166 The court also indicated that it
was not concerned with Reexamination Clause problems, although it
did not clearly explain its rationale. 167 Presumably, the court reasoned
that the class issues (i.e., whether a defect existed in the windows
when they left the factory, whether the defendant had a duty to
disclose the defect, and whether the defendant attempted to modify its
warranty) did not overlap conceptually with the individual issues (i.e.,
causation).1 68 The court also lauded the district court for declining to
certify a seventh state subclass due to the fact that the consumer
protection act of that state would have required a plaintiff-specific,
subjective analysis.169
c. Environmental Torts
As in consumer fraud litigation, claims brought under
environmental tort laws may be more amenable to issue class
certification on elements of liability than claims brought under other
substantive bodies of law. For example, another 2003 opinion by
Judge Posner, the same judge who denied certification in In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc. but approved it in Pella, also approved issue class
certification in an environmental tort action.1 70 The case, Mejdrech v.
Met-Coil Systems Corp., involved 1,000 plaintiffs living within two
under Rule 23(b)(3) were state-specific, and included plaintiffs who had a manifest defect in their
windows and whose windows were already replaced. Id. at 392.
163. Id. at 392-93.
164. Id. at 393-94.
165. Id. at 392-94.
166. See id. at 393-95.
167. Id. at 395.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 396.
170. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003).
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miles of a factory outside of Chicago. The plaintiffs alleged that a
factory storage tank leaked a noxious solvent, which seeped into the
groundwater of their homes. 17 1 The plaintiffs sought both injunctive
and monetary relief.172 Recognizing the highly individualized nature of
the injury and damages determinations as inappropriate for class
treatment, the district court judge certified the class only as to the
existence and geographic scope of the contamination. 173 In reviewing
the facts and affirming the certification, Judge Posner indicated that
issue class certification was appropriate here both because the
certified questions were identical across all of the claimants and
because they were relatively simple. 174 Distinguishing this case from
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., Posner said, "When enormous
consequences turn on the correct resolution of a complex factual
question, the risk of error in having it decided once and for all by one
trier of fact rather than letting a consensus emerge from several trials
may be undue."'175 He further mentioned the absence of choice-of-law
concerns, given that all class members lived in a small geographic
176
area.
d. ConstitutionalTorts
Although perhaps less amenable to element-specific issue class
certification than consumer fraud and environmental tort claims,
constitutional torts may also be more amenable to issue class
certification than mass torts. In this body of law, courts have approved
issue class certification as to some, but not all, elements of liability.
For example, in In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, several
arrestees brought lawsuits challenging a New York county
correctional division's blanket strip search policy for new,
misdemeanor detainees. 177 The detainees sought compensatory
damages, punitive damages, declaratory relief stating that the policy
was unconstitutional, and an injunction barring enforcement of the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 911-12.
Id. at 912.
Id.
461 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2006).
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policy.178 They also moved to consolidate 9the actions and proceed as an
17
opt-out class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).
The district court granted the consolidation but denied class
of common-issue
lack
the
solely on
based
certification
predominance. 180 Although the court considered issue class
certification as to several elements of liability-namely, (1) whether
defendants maintained a strip search policy, (2) whether that policy
was unconstitutional, and (3) whether all defendants may be liable-it
declined to grant certification because it perceived "considerable doubt
as to the propriety of using Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in this fashion," relying on
the rule established in Castano.'8 ' In response to several failed
attempts by the plaintiffs to have the court reconsider its class
certification decision, the defendants conceded "one common issue"
that "might be appropriate for class consideration ... namely, whether
the [correctional department's] strip search policy during the class
' 18 2
period was constitutional."
On appeal of the certification denial, the Second Circuit
directed the district court to certify the class on the issue of liability.183
It stated, "contrary to the District Court's reservations, a court may
employ Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify a class on a particular issue even if
the action as a whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement." 18 4 Additionally, the Second Circuit found that the
district court had 'erred when it eliminated the question conceded by
the defendants from the predominance analysis.18 5 As its rationale,
18 6
the court touted many of the advantages of issue class certification:
Rule 23 seeks greater efficiency via collective adjudication and, relatedly greater
uniformity of decision as to similarly situated parties. For these reasons we have written
that when plaintiffs are "allegedly aggrieved by a single policy of defendants," such as
the blanket policy at issue here, the case presents "precisely the type of situation for
which the class action 7 device is suited& since nearly identical litigations can be
18
adjudicated in unison.

In a separate section, the court also rebuked the defendants'
argument that the plaintiffs had not satisfied predominance because
178. Id. at 222.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 222-23 (quoting the district court's dissent).
181. Id.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 224 (quoting the defendant's concession).
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 227-28.
See id. at 228.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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resolving class membership required individualized determinations.18 8
Instead, the court noted that the class definition was narrowly
tailored to exclude individuals searched under probable cause.18 9 The
fact that the county detention facility possessed records of those
prisoners strip-searched under the policy further ameliorated this
concern. 190
The court also rejected arguments that the class-action device
was not superior in this case, setting forth four nonexclusive factors to
determine superiority in the class context: (1) the interest of the class
members in maintaining separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of
any litigation already commenced by or against members of the class;
(3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in a
particular forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action. 191 After balancing these factors, the
court determined that a class proceeding was superior. 192 This case
illustrates that the type of substantive law matters in determining
whether or not courts should divide some liability elements from other
liability elements when making issue class certification decisions. In
fact, the Fourth Circuit recently took a similar approach in Gunnels v.
193
Healthplan Services Inc.
Similarly, in Chiang v. Veneman, the Third Circuit partially
reversed the certification of a class of minority Virgin Islanders trying
to obtain rural housing loans. 194 The minority group alleged
discrimination in the administration of the loan program. 195 Using the
issue class tool, the court upheld class certification on whether a
pattern or practice of discrimination existed. 196 But the court rejected
the certification of both an injury-related element (eligibility for the
loan programs) and the calculation of damages. 197 With regard to the
eligibility element, the court believed that individual issues
predominated, thereby thwarting cl ass certification. 198 Therefore,
separating elements of liability from other elements of liability

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).

Id.
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003).
Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 274 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 267-68, 274.
Id. at 267-68.
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appears to be a multifaceted inquiry that requires the careful
consideration of a number of factors. These issues will be revisited in
Part IV of the Note.
2. Elements of Liability vs. Affirmative Defenses
Similar to situations where courts single out only certain
elements of liability for class treatment, a proposed separation of
general liability and affirmative defenses (where only one category
receives class treatment) may raise equivalent concerns. 99 Like the
element of proximate cause, 20 0 affirmative defenses-such as
comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, and statutory
defenses-typically prevent class treatment because they often require
individual determinations (e.g., considerations of whether a specific
defense protects the defendant from a particular class member's
claim). 20 1 Plaintiffs attempting to certify liability elements in cases
where the defendant might claim affirmative defenses tend to fail due
to Reexamination Clause concerns resulting from conceptual overlap.
For example, as Judge Posner stated in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., the division between negligence and comparative negligence is
problematic because "[c]omparative negligence entails, as the name
implies, a comparison of the degree of negligence of plaintiff and
defendant." 20 2 The Fifth Circuit reiterated this same concern in
Castano when it held that severing a defendant's conduct from
comparative negligence risks producing inconsistent judgments. 20 3 The
court went on to say that "[t]here is a risk that in apportioning fault,
the second jury could reevaluate the defendant's fault, determine that
defendant was not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the
20 4
plaintiff."
These complications may seem inconsistent with courts'
general reluctance to deny class certification as a whole based simply
199. In fact, cases where elements of a claim are being singled out for class treatment
typically also involve a class-treatment separation between liability and affirmative defenses.
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995).
200. Discussed above in Part IV.A in connection with In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. and
Castano.
201. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303. Additionally, choice-of-law
concerns may exist within affirmative defense law, making class treatment of that part of the
lawsuit unacceptable. Castano, 84 F.3d at 743 n.15 ("Differences in affirmative defenses also
exist. Assumption of risk is a complete defense to a products claim in some [but not all) states.").
202. Castano, 84 F.3d at 743 n.15; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303.
203. Castano, 84 F.3d at 751.
204. Id.

1616

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1585

on the presence of an affirmative defense directed at an individual
class member. However, when certification analysis is broadened to
the level of the class as a whole, individualized predominance concerns
relating to each component of the litigation carry less weight. This
was precisely the case in Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems,
Inc., where the First Circuit recognized the utility of partial
certification and reversed the decertification of a class of wireless
telephone customers alleging breach of contract against a
telecommunications provider. 2 5 Although the First Circuit permitted
certification of the entire class, despite the defendant's argument that
the waiver defense at issue required individual hearings, it reserved
the right to later limit certification to only the common issues. In
making this determination, the court reasoned that, despite variances
in its applicability to different class members, the waiver defense was
common to the class and therefore appropriate for class treatment. As
this Section shows, attempts to separate elements of liability from
affirmative defenses may depend on the conceptual overlap between
the claim and the defense. Once again, substantive law seems to make
a material difference in the appropriateness of issue classes within
this category. However, despite the Smilow ruling, which was based
on the concept that affirmative defenses can apply to the class as a
whole, after Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, it will perhaps be difficult
to justify issue class certification separating liability from affirmative
defenses at all. This is because that case iterated that affirmative
defenses are very individualized to the plaintiff that they are being
asserted against.2 0 6
3. Liability vs. Remedy
Courts might also choose to divide the issue of liability, or legal
responsibility, from the remedy, or the restitution or repayment owed.
Treating liability and remedy differently for class certification
purposes seems, on the surface, to be markedly less complicated than
the previous two divisions discussed-partly because damages, often
compensatory, seem to be highly individualized. 20 7 In fact, this
division feels more akin to the bifurcation cases that appeared in the

205. Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile, 323 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003).
206. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011) (holding that the "Trial
by Formula" approach of the Ninth Circuit, where the rate of success of a sample set of class
members would be applied to the class as whole, was improper because it denied Wal-Mart its
right to try affirmative defenses against all individual plaintiffs).
207. Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 272-74 (3d Cir. 2004).
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early history of Rule 23(c)(4). 208 But unlike in those cases, where the
same juries assessed damages in different phases, different juries
would assess the issues of liability and damages in modern issue class
cases. Just as with the separation of liability elements from other
liability elements or affirmative defenses, this might also raise
Reexamination Clause concerns.
Modern courts have not drawn concrete distinctions between
liability and remedy for issue class certification. Instead, courts have
used the bifurcation tool in these contexts. In fact, the Smilow court
noted that damages are generally individualized matters, similar to
affirmative defenses, even where class treatment is given to the class
as a whole. Indeed, the Smilow fact pattern-where a mechanical
computer model based on records and objective criteria could likely
calculate the damage determinations-is likely one of the only
situations where damages could be common enough for independent
issue certification.
One argument supporting a division along these grounds stems
20 9
from the fact that Rule 23(b)(2) plaintiffs in pattern-or-practice
employment discrimination suits might "prefer to litigate damages
claims on their own behalf, and may have a constitutional entitlement

to do

so."210

Therefore, it makes sense to use issue class certification

for just the liability issue, thereby allowing plaintiffs to opt out of the
class damages action. This is effectively the same thing that the
Seventh Circuit suggested in Allen v. InternationalTruck Co., which is
discussed later in this Note, where the court confined opt-outs to the
damages action. 211 Using the Allen case as a definitive example, issue
class certification separating liability from remedy should almost
always be appropriate.
4. Claims for Divisible Relief vs. Claims for Indivisible Relief
Perhaps the division most amenable to issue class treatment is
the separation between claims for divisible relief and claims for
indivisible relief. Divisible relief, such as monetary relief, is a remedy
208. Supra p. 1595-96; see, e.g., Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977);
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968). This was discussed in the first sentence of
Part II.B.1.
209. Pattern or practice exists where evidence establishes that a defendant has acted in a
discriminatory manner as part of their regular behavior instead of just in an isolated incident. A
Patternor Practiceof Discrimination,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov
crt/aboutthce/housing-pattern.php (last visited Aug. 11, 2011).
210. Allen v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004).
211. Id.; see also infra p. 1618.

1618

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1585

that can be provided to one individual without affecting another.
Indivisible relief, such as a behavioral injunction, impacts everyone.
Effectively, an indivisible remedy for one is a remedy for all. This
division most commonly arises in the context of a mandatory class
action under Rule 23(b)(2). Although the Supreme Court recently
declined to rule whether divisible relief in the form of monetary
damages could ever be coupled with indivisible relief and certified
under Rule 23(b)(2), it did hold that the rule applies only where a
single injunction or declaratory judgment (common forms of indivisible
relief) would provide relief to the entire class without the involvement
of individualized remedies. 212 In most of these cases, the ability of
would-be class members to opt out should not matter, because if some
plaintiffs achieve success in stopping the adverse actions of a
defendant, either through an injunction or a declaratory judgment, the
benefits will accrue to all individuals affected by the defendant's
actions, regardless of their status as parties to the lawsuit.
In Allen v. International Truck Co., former employees at a
truck and engine plant brought a Title VII action seeking both
financial and equitable relief as redress for alleged hostility and
harassment based on their race. 213 The Seventh Circuit, in certifying a
Rule 23(b)(2) class for equitable matters, rejected the district court's
conclusions that the employees' injuries were so dissimilar as to defeat
predominance. 214 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit chastised the district
court for its belief that the plaintiffs could only be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) for equitable relief, stating that the "financial stakes are too
high to be called incidental to equitable relief, and that opt-out rights
therefore must be extended." 2 15 The district court's belief that the
plaintiffs could only be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) was the impetus
for its ultimate denial of class certification, because the lower court
felt that certifying a class for equitable relief collided with the Seventh
Amendment's Reexamination Clause. The district court said "[f]actual
issues common to damages and equitable claims" would have to be
21 6
tried by a jury "whose resolution of factual matters" would control.
The Seventh Circuit later overturned this holding. In making this
decision to reverse, Judge Easterbrook said managing a class action
for prospective relief alone would not be any more difficult than

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).
358 F.3d at 472.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id.
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managing a class action for plaintiffs seeking both legal and equitable
relief.217 He suggested that, in all cases, regardless of formal class
status, the equitable component of damages unavoidably extends to
the class as a whole because it is infeasible to draft and enforce an
injunction that will bear on some, but not all potential class
members. 218 He then discussed the benefits of formal certification and
created a class for equitable relief. Thus, this division appears to be
the most amenable to issue class certification. However, despite initial
appearances that categorical approaches might help solve the issue
class appropriateness question, solutions do not come that easily. This
Note will next explore perhaps the most complicated case in issue
class history.
B. Why'd You Have to Go and Make Things So Complicated?:How
Clarity Would Help the Issue Class CertificationProblem
As this Note demonstrates, the case law surrounding the issue
class is a mess. But the case law also demonstrates that courts are on
the path towards rectifying this confusion. Courts are making
determinations about issue class appropriateness despite the absence
of an articulated standard. They are doing what courts should be
doing: using smart rationales to come to smart conclusions. Yet, as
demonstrated by a recent case heard by the Eleventh Circuit, simply
being smart is not enough. Courts need a uniform approach because
without one, issue class case law echoes the lyrics of Canadian pop
star Avril Lavigne's song Complicated, which asks, "[w]hy'd you have
2 19
to go and make things so complicated?"
Complicated is exactly the adjective to describe Brown v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. 220 The case involved a certified class of cigarette
smokers in Florida who originally sued several defendant tobacco
companies in state court in a proceeding known as Engle v. Liggett
Group, Inc.221 Here, unlike in the other cases this Note explored, the
certification decision was made under Florida state law. 222 However,

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 472.
Id.
AVRIL LAVIGNE, Complicated,on LET Go (Arista Records 2002).
611 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1326-27.
Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Engle (Engle I1), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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because Florida's certification law mirrors Rule 23,223 the application
of the state rule has relevance to the federal rules.
To manage the litigation, the trial court developed a trial plan
that had three phases. 224 Phase I addressed only common issues
relating to the defendants' conduct and the general health effects of
smoking. 225 In that phase, the jury found for the plaintiffs on several
factual issues, but the jurors were not asked whether the plaintiffclass had successfully proven any of the alleged claims. 226 In Phase II,
the same jury determined that the defendants' conduct legally caused
the class representatives' injuries and awarded the class $145 billion
in punitive damages. 227 The defendants appealed the case to the Third
District Court of Appeals and eventually to the Florida Supreme Court
228
before Phase III was conducted.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court,
overturning the award and decertifying the class. 229 The court also
affirmed the appellate court's rationale that class-action treatment
was inappropriate because "the plaintiffs smokers' claims [we]re
uniquely individualized and [could not] satisfy the 'predominance' and
'superiority' requirements imposed by Florida's class-action rules."230
Although the court denied aggregate treatment of all of the bundled
issues in the litigation, it nevertheless gave binding, preclusive effect
to the following common, factual issues determined by the jury in
Phase I: (1) that smoking cigarettes causes specific diseases; (2) that
nicotine in cigarettes is addictive; (3) that the defendants placed
cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably
dangerous; (4) that the defendants concealed or omitted material
information not otherwise known or available, knowing that the
omission was false or misleading; (5) that all of the defendants agreed
223. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 governs class certification in the state of Florida.
That rule tracks the four general certification requirements established by Rule 23(a). FLA. R.
CIV. P. 1.220(a); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Additionally, the Florida rule includes categorical
requirements similar to those in Rule 23(b). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b). For
example, the Florida rule contains an injunctive/declaratory relief category that is nearly
identical to Rule 23(b)(2) and an opt-out class category that is strikingly similar to Rule 23(b)(3).
Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(2)-(3), with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)-(3). See generally supra
Part II.A.
224. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 611 F.3d at 1326.
225. Id. at 1326-27.
226. Id. at 1327.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Engle (Engle I1), 853 So. 2d 434, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003)).
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to misrepresent information relating to the health effects of cigarettes
with the intention that smokers and the public would detrimentally
rely on this information; (6) that the defendants agreed to conceal or
omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes; (7) that all
of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; and
(8) that all of the defendants were negligent. 2 1 Effectively, by giving
these issues preclusive effect, the Florida Supreme Court authorized
postjudgment certification of an issue class. To fully resolve the
remaining issues, the court gave plaintiffs one year to file individual
232
actions, several of which ended up in federal district court.
Faced with the challenge of making the Florida Supreme
Court's issue-preclusive judgment operational, the federal district
court in Brown, one of the post-Engle individual actions, had to first
resolve a dispute between plaintiffs and defendants as to whether or
not the Phase I findings established entire elements of the various
causes of action (including, but not limited to, strict liability and
breach of warranty).233 A resolution of this dispute would ultimately
determine the scope of the individual, follow-on trials. The court ruled
in a pretrial order that lack of clarity as to "what issues were actually
decided during the Phase I trial and how to apply them in individual
claims" prevented them from having preclusive effect in the
subsequent, individual actions. 234 Noting the ambiguity in the special
verdict form used in Phase I, the court reasoned that speculating as to
what the form meant to the current litigation and then permitting
preclusion to the full extent of that interpretation would violate the
235
due process rights of the tobacco companies.
On interlocutory appeal by the plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to address the constitutional issue. 236 Instead, the court found
that, under Florida preclusion law, which controlled in accord with the
Full Faith and Credit Act, 237 the Phase I findings had to be "given
238
effect to the full extent of, but no farther than, what the jury found."
231. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1276-77 (Fla. 2006).
232. See generally supra note 15, at F-15.
233. Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
234. Id. (The order stated that "the findings [could] not be given preclusive effect in any
proceeding to establish any element of the Engle plaintiffs claim").
235. Id. at 1345.
236. Id. at 1331.
237. Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must "give
preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same extent as would courts of the state in
which the judgment was entered." Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1331
(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Kahn v. Smith Barney Shearson Inc., 115 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1997)).
238. Id. at 1334.

1622

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1585

In practical effect, this was a win for the defendants, because although
the decision vacated the district court's order and gave preclusive
effect to the Phase I findings as factual issues, the issue preclusion did
239
not extend to claim elements.
The Brown case is of practical significance because it
illustrates the confusion that results when a court retroactively
creates issue classes after initial issues have been determined. It also
highlights another reason why clarity is necessary in issue class law:
to guide lower courts in accurately defining judgments that will yield
meaningful, issue-preclusive effects even in the event of whole-class
decertification. Without such guidance, already-conducted jury
decisions may become as worthless as they became in Brown,
resulting in extreme judicial inefficiency.
IV. SOLUTION: WHEN TO SPLIT THE BABY

As illustrated above, the same courts (and even the same
judges) reach divergent results on whether or not to allow issue class
certification in various situations. However, when categorized by type
of division and viewed by category of substantive law, the outcomes of
partial certification requests seem more consistent. This suggests that
courts are assessing similar factors, namely how the lawsuits are
240
being divided and the substantive characteristics of the claims.
However, due to the complexity of the interaction between the type of
division and the characteristics of the substantive law, categorical
rules for issue class certification are difficult to formulate. In fact,
creating per se rules would lead to either underuse or overuse of the
issue class. The former would cause judicial inefficiency by requiring
independent full-length trials for all individual plaintiffs on common
issues, while the latter would cause judicial inefficiency by producing
erroneous issue classes that cause disorder when overturned on
appeal. Moreover, determining issue class appropriateness based
solely on a predetermined judgement of the divisibility of elements in
the substantive legal claim would place the proverbial cart before the
horse, because plaintiffs, who choose to pursue particular causes of
action, would effectively determine the appropriateness of their own
239. Id. at 1336.
240. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.03, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft

2009) ("Once again, the broad-brush distinctions between upstream and downstream matters
and between economic-injury claims and personal-injury claims . . . as well as the interplay
between the viability of claims on an individual basis and the variation in those claims ... bear
attention.").
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issue class. For example, plaintiffs' counsel might elect to pursue or
forgo certain claims simply to retain the issue class device.
Yet, leaving the issue class in its current unstructured form is
also untenable, as this, too, threatens to create judicial inefficiency
due to forum-shopping fears, as well as differences between
jurisdictions and unfairness to individual plaintiffs. 241 Instead, courts
must strike a consistent balance. This balance must articulate guiding
principles for judges while also allowing them discretion to investigate
the complex relationships between the type of division proposed and
the underlying substantive claim. One answer, advocated by the ALI
in Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, suggests that issue
class appropriateness turns on how cleanly class issues can be
separated from other, more individualized matters.
A. Adoption of the ALI Approach
The ALI draft rules suggest that, on common issues of liability,
issue class certification is appropriate "when substantive law
separates that issue from the choice and distribution of appropriate
remedies and from other issues concerning liability. ' '242 This effectively
gives courts the green light to use issue classes where elements of
liability are being separated either from other elements of liability or
from affirmative defenses. 243 This approach also accepts that issue
class treatment should largely remain a matter of judicial
discretion. 244 As the comments following the proposed ALI rule
suggest, courts should consider the following concerns in making these
types of liability divisions: (1) whether there are common issues with
similar functional content across all claims to be aggregated; (2)

241. See supra Introduction.
242. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.03(a) (Proposed Final Draft

2009). A drafter's comment also notes that "aggregate treatment of a common issue does not
materially advance the resolution of multiple claims when the evidence in the aggregate
proceeding would need to be substantially reconsidered in subsequent proceedings on other
issues." Id. § 2.03, cmt. b. Additionally, this comment notes that courts should be constrained in
their ability to use issue classes by the "practical need for other fact finders or other courts in
proceedings on remaining issues to determine the issue-preclusive effect of the class-action
proceeding on liability overall or particular elements thereof." Id. For this reason, the ability to
identify the specific issues being examined through class treatment, perhaps by using tools like
special verdicts and allowing interlocutory appeal, would prevent problems such as those in
Brown v. R.J.Reynolds. See id.
243. Id. § 2.03, cmt. b ("Liability issues suitable for class-action treatment under subsection
(a) might encompass the entire range of elements necessary to establish the defendant's liability
to all claimants or only particular elements of claims.").
244. Id. § 2.03, cmt. a.
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whether substantive law cleanly separates the common issue from
remedial questions and from other issues concerning liability; and (3)
whether there are specific, identifiable elements whose aggregate
245
evaluation will materially advance the resolution of the litigation.
By using this approach, courts will avoid choice-of-law pitfalls,
Reexamination Clause concerns, and complicated problems like those
explored in Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 24 6 However, as this
Note will later discuss, this approach may not be sufficiently clear to
promote uniformity in issue class determinations.
On the issue of liability versus remedy, the ALI rules suggest
that both common issues of liability and individual issues of remedy
might be appropriate for class treatment "when a determination of the
liability issues, in practical effect, will determine both the choice of
''247
remedy and the method for its distribution on an individual basis.
This approach assumes that it is usually appropriate to split litigation
between liability and remedy, 248 and this assumption likely derives
from the notion that remedies are typically more individualized in
nature. However, as the rule recognizes, if this is not the case and
remedy is common to the class as a whole, courts should have the
power to utilize issue classes for both liability and remedy. 249 As
already explored, this approach is consistent with the case law.
Also consistent with this approach to remedy generally, a
separate proposed rule addresses the divide between indivisible and
divisible remedies. 250 The rule proposes that a court may authorize
aggregate treatment on matters related to indivisible remedy without
providing the ability for class members to opt out. 25 1 This principle
remains true even where "additional divisible remedies are also
available that warrant individual treatment or aggregate but nonmandatory treatment." 25 2 This approach tracks the outcome in Allen v.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. § 2.03, cmt. b.
See Id.
Id. § 2.03(b).
See id.
See e.g., Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003).

250. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04. In sections (a) and (b), this

proposed rule defines divisible remedies as "those that entail the distribution of relief to one or
more claimants individually, without determining in practical effect the application or
availability of the same remedy to any other claimant" and indivisible remedies as "those such
that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter determines the application or
availability of the same remedy to other claimants." Id.
251. Id. § 2.03(c).
252. Id.
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International Truck & Engine Corp.253 and emphasizes "matters of
functionality and practical operation rather than inherited categorical
labels."254 The proposed rule effectively orders that, when claimants
seek a prohibitory injunction or a declaratory judgment using Rules
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) and that relief alters a generally applicable
practice propagated by the defendant, those benefits affect all persons
subject to the disputed practice regardless of their actual membership
in the lawsuit. 255 This same effect occurs where the recovery comes
from a limited fund, making class treatment appropriate for the
indivisible issues but not for the divisible issues. 256 Because adoption
of this rule would bring the law in line with practical realities, this is
an appropriate approach that courts should adopt. 25 7 In fact, because
this indivisible versus divisible relief rule is sufficiently clear, the
Supreme Court should adopt it as part of Rule 23 pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act.
However, the liability- and remedy-based proposed rules are
not sufficiently clear for this treatment, because they rely too heavily
on a "you know it when you see it" doctrine that has been rejected in
other areas of the law. 258 Although the ALI approach comports with
the loose rubric already established by the case law, it is not judicially
workable for this reason. However, that does not mean that it lacks
value. In fact, because the ALI approach honors the primary factors
discussed above-namely, it respects where the litigation is being
sliced and requires the split to happen "at the joint," 259 while also
respecting the content of substantive law-it should serve as a

253. See 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004).
254. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft
2009).

255. Id.
256. Id. A limited fund means there is a finite pool of resources from which plaintiffs can
recover. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 819 (1999). The comments to the ALI
proposed rules state that use of the issue class taken in the context of a limited fund merely
"recognizes the preexisting interdependence of [class members' claims] and does not impose an
unwanted relationship." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, cmt. a

(Proposed Final Draft 2009). In fact, such treatment "is likely to be preferable to serial litigation
in its capacity to provide for equitable distribution of the limit fund among all claimants." Id.
257. Id.
258. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding in a First
Amendment obscenity case that hard-core pornography is not protected and that it is identifiable
because "I know it when I see it"). Due in part to the unworkable nature of this doctrine,
obscenity jurisprudence remained fragmented until a workable test was articulated in Miller v.
California.413 U.S. 15 (1973).
259. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303.
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springboard for the adoption of a more workable approach. 260 In order
to implement the ALI proposed rules in a more practical manner, this
Note next argues that the Supreme Court should use common law to
establish a judicial balancing test based on the ALI proposals for
determining issue class appropriateness in liability and remedy
contexts. Finally, this Note goes one step further and suggests that, to
foster more thoughtful use of the issue class tool, courts should adopt
a new approach to choice-of-law problems that continue to thwart
findings of commonality and predominance even when viewed through
the issue-specific aperture.
B. Additional Clarifying Tools
1. A Judicial Balancing Test
Following the general principles established by the ALI, the
Supreme Court should adopt a balancing test to determine whether or
not conceptual overlap or difficulty in defining the issue for class
treatment should preclude use of partial certification. The primary
question should be: Do efficiency interests flowing from class
treatment of the issue outweigh potential harms? 261 Although this
sounds similar to the superiority inquiry already applied for Rule
23(b)(3) classes, courts would apply this analysis to the specific issue
under consideration for issue class certification. Additionally, this
question would apply not only to issue classes being certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), but to all issue classes. In applying this analysis to the
proposed issue class, courts should weigh several factors on each side
of the equation, and if the factors weigh in favor of issue class use,
then a court should employ the tool. If the analysis cuts the other way,
then a court should decline to certify an issue class.
On the efficiency side, judges should consider the efficiencies to
the judicial system provided by a single adjudication instead of
several, as well as the efficiencies to plaintiffs who might pool their
262
resources to attain partial victories on a single issue.
260. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.03, cmt. b (Proposed Final

Draft 2009).
261. This inquiry is very similar to the inquiry used by Judge Posner in Mejdrech v. Met-Coil
Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003). However, in this Note, the question is framed more
broadly in order to consider efficiencies beyond mere judicial efficiency and injury to the
defendant in the event that the trial court gets it wrong.
262. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Max Heuer, Class Certification: Trends and Developments
Over the Last Five Years (2005-2010), in THE 14TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS
ACTIONS A-117 (A.B.A. ed., 2010).
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Consideration of the harms requires a more complicated
analysis. The factors that courts should consider on this side include:
(1) the relative simplicity of the issue to be resolved in the class
proceeding (if it is simple, the court is more likely to get it right on the
first attempt, resulting in less prejudice to the defendant); (2) the
stakes of a victory or defeat in the issue class proceeding and the
ability of such a proceeding to force settlement; (3) the number of
overlapping facts relevant to both the class and nonclass issues; (4)
the specificity of the proposed class; and (5) the nature of the
underlying substantive law. Some, but not all, of these factors
appeared in recent opinions by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit,
263
serving as relevant guides to making the necessary determinations.
If courts in all jurisdictions looked to these specific factors to
that would
help them make determinations-determinations
consistently mirror the ALI approach-issue-class litigation would
serve as an important tool for judicial efficiency. Litigants would know
when to pursue issue classes, and courts would fairly and evenly apply
the law. Finally, the minority of courts with laws more favorable to
issue class certification would no longer swallow the decisions of the
majority by serving as issue class mills. To assist in adoption of such a
standard, the Supreme Court should codify this approach by granting
certiorari to an issue class case and using its opinion to establish this
standard. 264 This action would achieve the desired, aforementioned
benefits while retaining desired judicial discretion, an aspect
inherently built into balancing formulas. As the antithesis of a
categorical determination of issue class appropriateness, a balancing
test also retains more flexibility.
The advocated approach is designed to be analytically distinct
from, and a precursor to, the determination of whether plaintiffs have
satisfied the Rule 23(a) and 23(b) requirements. However, the
presence or absence of issue class appropriateness might help inform
those more complicated inquires. For example, a finding that issue
class certification is appropriate would more likely than not lead to a
263. In Mejdrech, Judge Posner considered the case's relative simplicity and the stakes. See,
e.g., Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2003). In Pella, he
considered the simplicity of the case, the lack of overlapping facts, and the specificity of the
proposed class. See, e.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393-96 (7th Cir. 2010). And in In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., he considered the stakes, the number of overlapping facts, and the
underlying substantive legal issues. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995).
264. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle in
October 2007. 552 U.S. 941, 941 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court also denied a rehearing in
November 2007. 522 U.S. 1056, 1056 (2007).
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finding that plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(a) prerequisitesparticularly given the trend to allow issue-specific satisfaction of
prerequisite certification requirements even when the litigation as a
whole does not satisfy them. 265 On the other hand, an absence of issue
class appropriateness would abruptly end the certification inquiry,
allowing courts to avoid the complex investigation into numerosity,
commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority.
Ending the certification inquiry when issue class certification is
inappropriate also promotes judicial efficiency by allowing courts to
avoid senseless exploration into the Rule 23 prerequisites while
266
additionally affording judges a healthy measure of discretion.
2. A Burden-Shifting Approach to Cure Choice-of-Law Problems
Although some determination of commonality is inherent in
both the ALI approach and in the balancing test suggested above,
flaws discovered during the court's inquiry into the satisfaction of the
Rule 23 requirements might still bar certification. This is the problem
mentioned above, where a Band-Aid cannot close a wound that needs
stitches. Issue classes cannot solve choice-of-law problems, which often
prevent certification of multistate or nationwide classes during the
267
court's inquiry into commonality and predominance.
In fact, given the utility of issue classes and their ability to
promote judicial efficiency, courts in some cases-most notably where
the nuances in various state laws are extremely minor-should allow
issue class plaintiffs suffering from commonality or predominance
flaws, as the result of nuances in the laws of several jurisdictions, to
prove that these nuances will not affect the outcome of the case. 268 In
order to ensure this burden is not easily met, thereby preserving the
sanctity of the predominance standard, courts should require plaintiffs
to prove this by clear and convincing evidence, instead of by the more
265. The primary barrier to certification after this point rests in choice-of-law differences on
the specific issue targeted for certification. This was one of the problems discussed in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., where the negligence law differed between states. Adequacy and
numerosity problems might also thwart issue class certification, but as those concerns are more
generally applicable to the class as a whole, they are beyond the scope of this Note.
266. See In re Nassau County Strip Searches, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
appellate courts are generally deferential to class certifications by lower courts).
267. For example, choice-of-law problems were an insurmountable barrier in In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc.
268. The burden of proof should be heightened in these cases because if certification is
granted, the preclusive effects of the judgment will bind all parties, and those parties will never
have the chance to find out whether the outcome would actually have been different if they had
litigated in an individual proceeding in state court.
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269
typical preponderance of the evidence standard used in civil cases.
The clear and convincing standard is already used in civil cases that
involve allegations of fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing, cases that
have a more substantial interest at stake than just money, cases
where the defendant runs the risk of suffering a tarnished reputation,
270
cases where a particularly important individual interest is at stake,
and cases involving civil commitment of the mentally ill to a
treatment facility. 27 1 Just as in those categories, important interests
for the parties and for the state governments whose laws are at issue
are involved in overriding choice-of-law nuances through the
certification process. For this reason, by analogy, an application of the
clear and convincing standard makes sense here.
Once adopted, plaintiffs could satisfy this higher burden by
showing that the law is identical in form across relevant jurisdictions,
the law is applied consistently in all relevant jurisdictions, or nuances
in the law have made no statistically significant difference in the
outcome of prior cases. Upon such an illustration, choice-of-law
concerns should become irrelevant to the certification decision.
Critics may argue that allowing courts to make such an inquiry
goes too far by forcing judges, instead of juries, to determine the effect
of legal nuances during the certification phase, prior to juror
involvement. But this approach is consistent with current judicial
practice now that the Eisen rule no longer has effect. 272 In fact, now
that courts may examine the merits of a claim in making certification
decisions, some class proceedings with merit-based flaws never make
it to a jury at all-judges acting as gatekeepers screen them out.
Because judges do make these determinations, giving them the
latitude to be more generous with issue class certification-by
ensuring that choice-of-law concerns do not unnecessarily thwart
certification-would reduce the number of claims disposed of in the
procedural phase. This allows more claims to reach a jury, preventing
the judge from serving as the final arbiter of the claim. Moreover, this
approach does not violate the Erie doctrine, which mandates that a
federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state
substantive law. 273 Instead, it forces the federal courts to respect the
nuances of state laws by imposing the higher clear and convincing
269. Civil Case, CRIMINAL LAW LAWYER SOURCE, http://www.criminal-law-lawyersource.comlterms/civil-case.html (last visited July 18, 2011).
269. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1978) (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 433.
272. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011).
273. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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evidence standard and merely giving more flexibility to judges to
aggregate plaintiffs where laws are the same in text and in practice.
This flexibility makes sense given that many laws-particularly those
of geographically proximate states-are modeled after each other. The
proposed solution additionally prevents the reexamination of the same
factual issues, thereby comporting with Seventh Amendment
constitutional guarantees. For these reasons, this approach strikes an
appropriate balance among current legal precedent and allows use of
issue classes in a way that promotes both efficiency and justice.
V. CONCLUSION

As this Note illustrates, case law and history suggest that issue
classes are here to stay. Use of issue classes promotes economy of time
and money by allowing courts to lump multiple plaintiffs together into
a single class for common issues while reserving individual issues for
adjudication in follow-on trials in the event that plaintiffs succeed as a
class. However, courts still seem unsure of how to determine when the
use of Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate-a determination required by the
text of the rule-resulting in inconsistent certification decisions.
Analogizing to the biblical story where King Solomon threatens
to split a living baby in the pursuit of truth and justice, this Note
illustrates that the modern litigious climate, where judicial resources
are strained, requires the splitting of lawsuits in some, but not all,
contexts. Unlike Solomon, who likely never intended to complete the
dirty deed, judges must understand when to slice and when to sheath.
In essence, they must appropriately determine when issue class
certification is proper. To do this, judges need direction and guidance.
After reviewing case law and the approach adopted by the ALI,
both of which move toward a solution, this Note urges the Supreme
Court to do three things. First, the Court should adopt the ALI
approach to indivisible versus divisible relief as part of Rule 23,
pursuant to its power under the Rules Enabling Act. Second, the
Court should adopt a multifactor balancing test to assist lower courts
in making decisions on issue class appropriateness when considering
the separation of liability elements from either other liability elements
or affirmative defenses. Third, and finally, this Note argues that issue
classes can better serve their role if courts adopt a more generous
approach to choice-of-law problems by allowing class counsel to prove
that minor state law variations will have no bearing on the outcome of
the case. Courts currently can, and do, split the baby.
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However, with a little guidance, courts may also earn the confidence of
litigants and academics alike and perform their jobs with few
fatalities or complications.
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